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The security dilemma, also referred to as the spiral model, is a term used in international relations and refers to a situation in which actions by a state intended to heighten its security, such as increasing its military strength or making alliances, can lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict, even when no side really desires it.〔Jervis, R. "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," ''World Politics'' vol. 30, no.2 (January 1978), pp. 167–174; and Jervis, R. ''Perception and Misperception in International Politics'' (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 58–113〕 The term was coined by the German scholar John H. Herz in his 1951 book ''Political Realism and Political Idealism''. At the same time British historian Herbert Butterfield described the same situation in his ''History and Human Relations'', but referred to it as the "absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma".〔(Roe, Paul. The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'? ''Journal of Peace Research'' vol. 36, no. 2 (Mar., 1999), pp. 183–202. )〕 In John Herz's words, the security dilemma is "A structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening".〔Herz, J. "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", ''World Politics'' vol. 2, no. 2 (1950): 171–201, at p. 157 (Published by Cambridge University Press)〕 A frequently cited example of the security dilemma is the beginning of World War I. Supporters of this viewpoint argue that the major European powers felt forced to go to war by feelings of insecurity over the alliances of their neighbors, despite not actually desiring the war. Furthermore, Germany's fear of fighting war on two fronts led it to the formulation of the infamous Schlieffen Plan, which specified a particularly accelerated mobilization timetable. The onset of German mobilization, in turn, put pressure on other states to start mobilizing early as well. However, other scholars dispute this interpretation of the origins of the war, contending that some of the states involved really ''did'' want the conflict. The security dilemma is a popular concept with cognitive and international relations theorists, who regard war as essentially arising from failures of communication. Functionalist theorists affirm that the key to avoiding war is the avoidance of miscommunication through proper signaling. The security dilemma has important relationships with other theories and doctrines of international security. Part of the strength of the security dilemma theory is that it subsumes and is consistent with a number of other theories. Other theories can be considered in terms of the security dilemma. ==Defensive realism== The security dilemma is the core assumption of defensive realism. According to Kenneth Waltz, because the world does not have a common government (it is "anarchic"), survival is the main motivation of states. States are distrustful of other states' intentions and as a consequence always try to maximize their own security; this results in the situation of the security dilemma.〔Baylis, J. and Smith, S. ''The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations''. Oxford University Press, 2005, 3rd ed.〕 Offense-defense theory of defensive realism is a potential theory to explain the level of threat arising from the security dilemma.〔Lynn-Jones, S.M. "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics", ''Security Studies'' vol. 4, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 660–691 (Published by Frank Cass, London)〕 Defensive realists often regard the success of the United States in WWI as being a result of the defensive approach taken by the United States. Had the United States taken an offensive stance, defensive realists argue that the United States would not have been secure.〔Walt, S.M. "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", ''Foreign Policy'' No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring 1998), pp. 29–32, 34–46 (Published by the Slate Group, a division of The Washington Post Company)〕 The conclusion from defensive realism is that in some circumstances states can escape the security dilemma. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Security dilemma」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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